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ABSTRACT: First, I motivate the following contradiction: since Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is
a method used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method; yet, since it is a method used to justify a
constitutive principle, it is a non-naturalistic method. Second, I argue that prima facie the best response to
this contradiction, given my motivations for it, is to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to
justify constitutive principles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following four jointly inconsistent propositions:
(P1) If a certain method is used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method.
(P2) Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science.
(P3) If a certain method is used to justify a constitutive principle, it is a nonnaturalistic method.
(P4) Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used to justify a constitutive
principle.
These four propositions are jointly inconsistent because P1 and P2 imply that Einstein’s
Elevator is, whereas P3 and P4 imply that it is not, a naturalistic method. In the first three
sections of this paper I attempt to motivate each of P1-P4. In the fourth section I argue
that, given this motivation, prima facie the best way to resolve the inconsistency among
these four propositions is to restrict the scope of P3—that is, to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.
2. P4
In this section I attempt to motivate P4, the proposition that Einstein’s elevator thought
experiment is a method used to justify a constitutive principle. To this end, I will (i) motivate the plausibility of the claim that thought experiments, particularly those in the natural sciences, can in principle be used for justification, (ii) explain Einstein’s elevator
thought experiment and then (iii) argue directly for P4.
It is widely held in the literature on thought experiments that some natural scientists have made use of thought experiments. For instance, Galileo is held to have used a
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thought experiment in the Discorsi against the Aristotelian thesis that heavier bodies fall
faster than lighter ones (1974: 66).1 Likewise, Einstein is held to have made use of a thought
experiment involving a chest or elevator (Einstein 2009: 80-3; Einstein and Infeld 1938: 2305).2 Additionally, thought experiments—on the majority of prominent accounts in the thought
experiment literature—can in principle provide justification.3 I cannot discuss the adequacy
of such accounts here; however, I will take the existence of such accounts to make plausible
the claim that thought experiments can in principle be used for justification.4
With this in mind, consider Einstein’s elevator thought experiment. To begin
imagine an elevator with an observer inside in a part of empty space so far from stars and
other large masses that points in it remain at rest or stay in uniform rectilinear motion
relative to the elevator (Einstein 2009: 78).5 Next, imagine that a cord attached to a hook
on the top of the elevator accelerates it upwards, as it were, at a constant rate (pp. 78 f.).
The acceleration of the elevator is transmitted to the observer via the floor such that he
may stand as we normally do (p. 79). Finally, imagine also that the observer finds that
every kind of body he releases falls toward the floor at the same rate, and that, given his
knowledge of gravitational fields, he comes to the conclusion that he and the elevator are
at rest in an unvarying gravitational field (pp. 79 f.).
Einstein then asks whether we should judge that the observer has erred in his
conclusion; he responds that, to “remain consistent,” we must answer in the negative (p.
80). For, in short, we can equally regard the elevator as being accelerated with respect to
“Galilean space” or as at rest in a gravitational field without contradiction and in accord
with known mechanical laws (p. 80). He then draws the following conclusion:
We have thus good grounds for extending the principle of relativity to include bodies of reference which are accelerated with respect to each other, and as a result we have gained a
powerful argument for a generalized postulate of relativity. (p. 80; emphasis added)

That is, I take it, Einstein concludes that we are justified in extending the principle of
relativity from the proposition that the laws of physics are the same for bodies of reference in all inertial frames to the proposition that the laws of physics are the same for bodies of reference in inertial and uniformly accelerated frames.
This new proposition, moreover, is a general form of the equivalence principle—
roughly, the principle that “the laws of physics take the same form in frames that are
freely falling in gravitational fields as they do in inertial frames” (Dainton 2001: 286).
1

See Brown (1991: 1-2), Sorensen (1992: 224), Miščević (1992: 216), Norton (1996: 340-3), Gendler
(1998: 398) and Nersessian (2007: 153). There is some question (i) about the form of the thought experiment given its historical context (Palmieri 2004), (ii) about whether it in fact provides justification
(McAllister 1996) and (iii) about whether Galileo performed the thought experiment as a real experiment (Gendler 1998: 402, n.10); however, none of these considerations undermine the claim that Galileo is widely held to have used this thought experiment.
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See Brown (1991: 18-20), Norton (1991: 136-8), Sorensen (1992: 183-4) and Nersessian (1992: 296).
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Some such accounts are found in Brown (1991, 2004), Sorensen (1992), Norton (1991, 1996, 2004),
Nersessian (1993, 2007), Miščević (1991, 2007) and Gendler (1998, 2000, 2004).

4

Relevant criticism is found in James McAllister’s (1996), which John Norton responds to (2004: 1149
f.), as well as in Peijnenburg and Atkinson’s (2003), which Daniel Cohnitz responds to (2006). Early, if
underdeveloped, criticism can be found in Duhem (1954: 202).
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Here I describe Einstein’s 1916 version but use “elevator” in place of “chest” as in his 1938 version.
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Hence, Einstein’s elevator thought experiment (whether successful or not) is a method
that is used (effectively) to justify the equivalence principle
The equivalence principle, moreover, is plausibly a “constitutive principle” of
the General Theory of Relativity (GTR)—i.e., one without which certain propositions of
GTR have no truth-value. In support, consider Michael Friedman’s account of the place
of the equivalence principle in GTR. GTR consists of three parts. First, the mathematical
part “contains the basic mathematical theories, representation, or structures intended to
describe the spatio-temporal framework” of the theory (2001: 79-80). Second, the physical part contains empirical laws meant to describe concrete physical phenomena with
elements of the mathematical part (p. 80). Third, the mechanical part consists of “coordinating principles”—i.e., principles that relate the mathematical part and concrete empirical
phenomena such that the laws of nature of the physical part have empirical meaning (ibid.).
As such, coordinating principles are required for the laws of nature to have a truth-value.
Two such coordinating principles are the light principle and the equivalence principle (p.
79). Hence, the equivalence principle is plausibly a constitutive principle of GTR.
In sum, then, it seems plausible that Einstein’s elevator thought experiment
(whether successful or not) is a method used (effectively) to justify a constitutive principle, i.e., the equivalence principle. As such, P4 seems plausible.
3. P1 AND P2
In this section I aim to motivate P1 and P2. P1 is the proposition that if something is a
method used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method. This proposition seems quite
plausible simply in virtue of the meanings of the terms. To be sure, I understand the expression “a method used in a natural science” to mean “a method used by natural scientists acting as natural scientists.”
To illustrate, consider the “dramatic confirmation” of GTR that occurred in 1919:
Einstein worked out that starlight passing very close to the Sun on its way to the Earth should
be deflected by 1.75 arc-seconds. Dyson and Eddington … mounted an expedition to Principe (off the coast of West Africa), where a total eclipse was due (only then are the stars adjacent to the Sun visible). The confirmation of Einstein’s prediction made headlines around the
world. (Dainton 2001: 293)

This measurement is clearly a method used by natural scientists, i.e., by Dyson and Eddington, acting as natural scientists. By contrast, the way in which Dyson and Eddington
travelled to Principe is a method used by natural scientists but not, as it were, natural scientists acting as natural scientists. The measurement then, unlike the method of travel, is
a method used in a natural science and, as such, is a naturalistic method.
Additionally, it also seems plausible that P2 is the case—that is, that Einstein’s
elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science, one used by a natural
scientist acting as a natural scientist. For the use of a method by a natural scientist in order to justify a change to a natural science, like Einstein’s use of his elevator thought
experiment, plausibly is such a method. By analogy, Dyson and Eddington plausibly were
natural scientists acting as scientists in Principe because they used a method, measurement,
in order to justify a change to natural science, to confirm GTR.
In sum, then, P1 and P2 seem plausible.
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4. P3
In this section I attempt in two ways to motivate P3—the proposition, in short, that no
naturalistic method can be used to justify a constitutive principle—and then raise two
concerns about this motivation.
First, it might be said that the methods of natural science cannot be used to justify constitutive principles because they presuppose such principles. That is, such methods
cannot be so used because constitutive principles are necessary conditions on the possibility of scientific (epistemic) practices and, as such, of the methods themselves. 6
Second, one might attempt to support P3 with an analogical argument. The analogy is between the aforementioned mathematical and mechanical parts of GTR on Michael Friedman’s account. The mechanical part, like the mathematical part, (i) is not justified by the same procedure that justifies the physical part of GTR and (ii) consists of
constitutive principles (2001: 71-80). Furthermore, it seems that the constitutive principles of the mathematical part cannot be justified by the methods of natural science. For
instance, the theorems and principles of the theory of Riemannian manifolds found in the
mathematical part of GTR are justified “purely mathematically” (p. 80). Therefore, it
might be inferred by analogy that the constitutive principles of the mechanical part of
GTR—i.e., the light principle and equivalence principle—also cannot be justified by the
methods of natural science. So, it may be inferred, since the constitutive principles of
GTR, which are found in the mathematical and mechanical parts, likely cannot be justified by naturalistic methods, constitutive principles more generally likely cannot justify
constitutive principles, and this supports P3.
One may then find P3 plausible. That said, it is not clear these motivations for
P3 are strong. With regard to the first motivation, it is not clear why some methods of a
natural science could not be used to justify the constitutive principles presupposed by
other methods of that or another science. For example, it is not clear why scientists who
work with GTR could not use their methods to justify constitutive principles in Newtonian mechanics in certain cases—roughly, those cases that involve only relatively slow
moving macroscopic objects with little mass.
Furthermore, with regard to the second motivation, the analogical argument, two
disanalogies between the mechanical and mathematical parts of GTR cast some doubt on
it. One disanalogy between the mathematical and mechanical parts is that they function
asymmetrically (Friedman 2001: 79). For instance, the mechanical part sets up a general
correspondence between the mathematical part and concrete physical phenomena whereas the mathematical part does not set up any such relation. Another disanalogy between
the two is that the mathematical part is strictly formal, or without empirical content,
whereas the mechanical part does have empirical content. For instance, whereas the four
dimensional space-time metric of the mathematical part of GTR has no empirical content,
the constitutive principles in the mechanical part of GTR evidently do; namely, the light
principle concerns the velocity of light and the equivalence principle concerns gravitational fields. This disanalogy seems particularly worrisome for the analogical argument
because the formal nature of the mathematical part is closely linked to its being axiomatized and, thereby, closely linked to its justification.
6

Cf. for example “Maimon’s famous objection that Kant begs the question quid facti” against Hume
(Franks 2007: 51-4).
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In sum, then, P3 seems plausible only to a limited extent.
5. CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, P1-P4 are jointly inconsistent. That is, P1 and P2 imply that
Einstein’s Elevator is, whereas P3 and P4 imply that it is not, a naturalistic method. Furthermore, in the preceding four sections I attempted to motivate each of P1-P4. In the
remainder of this paper I will argue that prima facie the best response to the inconsistency, given such motivation, is to restrict the scope of P3—that is, to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.
The reason for restricting the scope of P3 is that the motivation I was able to
provide for it seemed weaker than that for P1, P2 and P4. That is, P1, that Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science, seemed plausible simply
in virtue of the meaning of its terms. P2, that Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a
method used in a natural science, also seemed plausible because Einstein’s use of the
elevator thought experiment was plausibly a method used by a natural scientist to justify
a change to a natural science. Conversely, P3, that if a certain method is used to justify a
constitutive principle then it is a non-naturalistic method, did not appear very promising since
neither of the two motivations for it that I adduced seemed to yield much support. Hence, my
motivation for P3 seems weaker than that for P1 and P2. Furthermore, P4, that Einstein’s
elevator thought experiment is a method (effectively) used (whether successful for not) to
justify a constitutive principle, seemed plausible. For, in short, Einstein (effectively) used his
elevator thought experiment (whether or successful or not) as a method to justify an extension of the principle of relativity, which plausibly contains a constitutive principle, i.e., the
principle of equivalence. Thus, my motivation for P4 also seems stronger than that for P3.
Ultimately, then, given only such motivation, the best response to the contradiction between
P1-4 is on the face of it to restrict the scope of P3 as opposed to that of P1, P2 or P4—that is,
to allow that some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.
The least change in scope on P3 needed to avoid the contradiction, given the
motivation I provide, is to allow that a single naturalistic method can be used to justify
constitutive principles—namely, Einstein’s elevator thought experiment. One may attempt to widen this scope by considering other thought experiments with a similar structure. For example, Newton’s well-known bucket thought experiment may be understood
to justify constitutive principles in a similar way.
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1. INTRODUCTION
McComb’s paper is a nice elaboration on the mechanics of reasoning from thought experiments (TE) generally and on Einstein's elevator in particular. By and large, the description of the TE, its relation to other TEs, notably from Galileo, is nicely presented.
McComb asks us to consider the following four propositions:
(P1) If a certain method is used in a natural science, it is a naturalistic method.
(P2) Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used in a natural science.
(P3) If a certain method is used to justify a constitutive principle, it is a nonnaturalistic method.
(P4) Einstein’s elevator thought experiment is a method used to justify a constitutive
principle.
First, a minor quibble: In section 3 where P1 and P2 are motivated, McComb makes the
following claim: “To be sure, I understand the expression ‘a method used in natural science’ to mean ‘a method used by natural scientists acting as natural scientists.’” It is easy to
see why such a clarification was needed, however I think McComb opened himself up to an
interesting challenge: are TEs in the scope of what natural scientists do as natural scientists
exclusively? Couldn’t a philosopher have "motivated" the elevator TE instead of Einstein?
(Philosophers of science typically do this, as do others.) But this is a minor point.
Returning to McComb’s four propositions: P1and P2 by modus ponens yields N;
P3 and P4 by modus ponens yields ~N. On the assumption that P1-P4 are consistent, we
get both N and ~N, and so the inconsistency. Well then, what should we make of it and
why is it relevant? McComb has done an admirable job in exploiting this inconsistency
and his 'motivations' for each of these propositions (although I did present a minor challenge on one of them) are solid, McComb has not made it clear why he has taken the task
of rendering P1-P4 consistent. Another way of thinking of this is to think of how P1-P4
might form a generalized way of thinking in science and what would help scientists in
this regard; that is, what is the context of providing the reader with the set of propositions
made up of P1-P4 and why try to render them consistent?
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In point of fact they are not consistent. Following McComb’s own assertions we
have the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

(
(
(
(
(

)
)
(
) (2, Contra)
)
(
) (1,3 HS)
)
(
) (4, DeM)
⋁
) (given)
(given)
(MP, DS)

McComb will attempt to rectify this inconsistency by limiting the scope of P3 so that
“some naturalistic methods can be used to justify constitutive principles.” But this motivation is to render P1-P4 consistent and we come back to our question above, why do we
need these to be consistent? For clarification reasons, I think McComb should have elaborated on the conclusion he draws regarding the limited plausibility of P3. Why not just
eliminate it completely, given his argument, and add: P3* Some TEs in natural science
can be used to justify constitutive principles? This would have been simpler and would
not have exposed the presentation to a simple counter-argument.
I do note, too, McComb reasons to how justifying principles from TEs can lead
to higher order justifications and principles. I should think that elaborating on this would
add value to the paper in the long run. That is: the elevator TE is evidence for the Principle of Equivalence which then is evidence for the higher order GTR, which is the main
point in his conclusion. The ad hoc watering down of P3 might allow Einstein's TE to
function in justifying the principle of equivalence, but what is not explained is how one
might widen the scope to allow for other instances like Newton's bucket (or even better
Newton's Moon Test).
2. CONCLUSION
Finally, the argumentation theorists may want to know whether McComb’s presentation
simply deconstructed the logic in an isolated incident in the history of science, or is there
a grandeur lesson about an argument scheme that might be used in science more generally. The latter would be, to be sure, a larger project, but one that would be of interest to
philosophers of science and argumentation theorists alike.
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